Clarifying Einstein's First Derivation for Mass-Energy Equivalence and Consequently Making Ives's Criticism a Void

R. V. R. Pandya

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arXiv · 0705.0775

Clarifying Einstein's First Derivation for Mass-Energy Equivalence and Consequently Making Ives's Criticism a Void

R. V. R. Pandya

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Abstract

We study physical situation considered by Einstein (Ann. Physik, 17, 1905) for his first derivation of mass-energy equivalence. Einstein introduced a constant $C$ in his derivation and reasoning surrounding $C$ and equations containing $C$ caused criticism by Ives. Here we clarify Einstein's derivation and obtain a value for constant $C$. The obtained zero value for $C$ suggests alternative explanation for Einstein's derivation and makes Ives's criticism a void and for which details are also presented in this paper.

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R. V. R. Pandya. 2007-05-06. Clarifying Einstein's First Derivation for Mass-Energy Equivalence and Consequently Making Ives's Criticism a Void. https://arxiv.org/abs/0705.0775

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