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arXiv · 0707.1719

The Scientific Method

B. K. Jennings
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Abstract

The nature of the scientific method is controversial with claims that a single scientific method does not even exist. However the scientific method does exist. It is the building of logical and self consistent models to describe nature. The models are constrained by past observations and judged by their ability to correctly predict new observations and interesting phenomena. The observations exist independent of the models but acquire meaning from their context within a model. Observations must be carefully done and reproducible to minimize errors. Models assumptions that do not lead to testable predictions are rejected as unnecessary.

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B. K. Jennings. 2007-07-11. The Scientific Method. https://arxiv.org/abs/0707.1719

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