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arXiv · 0710.1307

Common Markets, Strong Currencies & the Collective Welfare

Esteban Guevara Hidalgo
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Abstract

The so called "globalization" process (i.e. the inexorable integration of markets, currencies, nation-states, technologies and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole) has a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that is tending to a maximum entropy state. This globalization process obeys a collective welfare principle in where the maximum payoff is given by the equilibrium of the system and its stability by the maximization of the welfare of the collective besides the individual welfare. This let us predict the apparition of big common markets and strong common currencies. They will reach the "equilibrium" by decreasing its number until they reach a state characterized by only one common currency and only one big common community around the world.

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Esteban Guevara Hidalgo. 2016-12-08. Common Markets, Strong Currencies & the Collective Welfare. https://arxiv.org/abs/0710.1307

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