arXiv · 0902.1964
Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria
Abstract
We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Yannick Viossat. 2009-02-11. Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.