A Prediction Market for Toxic Assets Prices

Abstract

We propose the development of a prediction market for forecasting prices for "toxic assets" to be transferred from Irish banks to the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). Such a market allows market participants to assume a stake in a security whose value is tied to a future event. We propose that securities are created whose value hinges on the transfer amount paid for loans from NAMA to a bank. In essence, bets are accepted on whether the price is higher or lower than a certain quoted figure. The prices of the securities represent transfer prices for toxic assets increases or decreases in line with market opinion. Prediction markets offer a proven means of aggregating distributed knowledge pertaining to fair market values in a scalable and transparent manner. They are incentive compatible (i.e. induce truthful reporting) and robust to strategic manipulation. We propose that a prediction market is run in parallel with the pricing procedure recommended by the European Commission. This procedure need not necessarily take heed of the prediction markets view in all cases but it may offer guidance and a means of anomaly detection. An online prediction market would offer everybody an opportunity to "have their say" in an open and transparent manner.