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arXiv · 1008.4239

History of Scientists? Elimination of Naive Beliefs about Movement - The testing of the theories of Galileo in his lifetime on board of a galley -

Abstract

Throughout the early history of Science the heliocentric world model was refused because it contradicted the thoughts of Aristotle and the medieval "Impetus" theory of movement. Even Galileo's sky observations did not lead to any acceptance of the heliocentric model, because scientists derived from Aristotle's physics that the earth was static. It was not until 1640 when Gassendi proved the principle of inertia on a moving galley, as well as Galileo's laws of free fall with a giant wheel that "impetus-physics" which incorporated naive beliefs about movement was abandoned. To understand the methods of calculating movement, novice students can be stitmulaed by using these initial experiments based on the dynamics of a ship movement and not rely on naïve approach. This can help novice students to attain a concept change from naïve to scientific conceptions about movement. Modern students who study movement were found to harbour many of the same naive beliefs as our scientific forefathers. The history behind the elimination of these naive beliefs is presented here in order to help encourage elimination of these naive beliefs. Several studies found these naive beliefs to be held by novice students today. These naive beliefs held in the Science of movement have posed major problems for teaching novice students. Conflicting methods of modelling these movements have been the source of much controversy over time as concepts changed. Considering a conceptual change in history can be helpful in education.

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BibTeXRIS

Matthias R. Risch. 2010-08-25. History of Scientists? Elimination of Naive Beliefs about Movement - The testing of the theories of Galileo in his lifetime on board of a galley -. https://doi.org/10.1002/200601148

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