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arXiv · 1106.2854

An approximate logic for measures

Isaac Goldbring·Henry Towsner
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Abstract

We present a logical framework for formalizing connections between finitary combinatorics and measure theory or ergodic theory that have appeared various places throughout the literature. We develop the basic syntax and semantics of this logic and give applications, showing that the method can express the classic Furstenberg correspondence and to give a short proof of the Szemerédi Regularity Lemma. We also derive some connections between the model-theoretic notion of stability and the Gowers uniformity norms from combinatorics.

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Isaac Goldbring, Henry Towsner. 2012-11-04. An approximate logic for measures. https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.2854

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