arXiv · 1209.4696
Insider-proof encryption with applications for quantum key distribution
Abstract
It has been pointed out that current protocols for device independent quantum key distribution can leak key to the adversary when devices are used repeatedly and that this issue has not been addressed. We introduce the notion of an insider-proof channel. This allows us to propose a means by which devices with memories could be reused from one run of a device independent quantum key distribution protocol to the next while bounding the leakage to Eve, under the assumption that one run of the protocol could be completed securely using devices with memories.
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Matthew McKague, Lana Sheridan. 2012-09-21. Insider-proof encryption with applications for quantum key distribution. https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.4696
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