Channel Independent Cryptographic Key Distribution

Benjamin T. H. Varcoe

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arXiv · 1211.4976

Channel Independent Cryptographic Key Distribution

Benjamin T. H. Varcoe

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Abstract

This paper presents a method of cryptographic key distribution using an `artificially' noisy channel. This is an important development because, while it is known that a noisy channel can be used to generate unconditional secrecy, there are many circumstances in which it is not possible to have a noisy information exchange, such as in error corrected communication stacks. It is shown that two legitimate parties can simulate a noisy channel by adding local noise onto the communication and that the simulated channel has a secrecy capacity even if the underlying channel does not. A derivation of the secrecy conditions is presented along with numerical simulations of the channel function to show that key exchange is feasible.

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BibTeX RIS

Benjamin T. H. Varcoe. 2012-12-03. Channel Independent Cryptographic Key Distribution. https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.4976

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