Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states

Abstract

An explanation for the political processes leading to the sudden collapse of empires and states would be useful for understanding both historical and contemporary political events. We seek a general description of state collapse spanning eras and cultures, from small kingdoms to continental empires, drawing on a suitably diverse range of historical sources. Our aim is to provide an accessible verbal hypothesis that bridges the gap between mathematical and social methodology. We use game-theory to determine whether factions within a state will accept the political status quo, or wish to better their circumstances through costly rebellion. In lieu of precise data we verify our model using sensitivity analysis. We find that a small amount of dissatisfaction is typically harmless, but can trigger sudden collapse when there is a sufficient buildup of political inequality. Contrary to intuition, a state is predicted to be least stable when its leadership is at the height of its political power and thus most able to exert its influence through external warfare, lavish expense or autocratic decree.