arXiv · 1307.5271
On the diffuseness of incomplete information game
Abstract
We introduce the "relative diffuseness" assumption to characterize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and general action spaces can be obtained. Moreover, we introduce a new notion of "undistinguishable purification" which strengthens the standard purification concept, and its existence follows from the relative diffuseness assumption.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Wei He, Xiang Sun. 2013-07-19. On the diffuseness of incomplete information game. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.004
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.