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arXiv · 1410.0534

Authentication System for Smart Homes Based on ARM7TDMI-S and IRIS-Fingerprint Recognition Technologies

Fredrick Romanus Ishengoma
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Abstract

With the rapid advancement in technology, smart homes have become applicable and so the need arise to solve the security challenges that are accompanied with its operation. Passwords and identity cards have been used as traditional authentication mechanisms in home environments, however, the rise of misuse of these mechanisms are proving them to be less reliable. For instance, ID cards can be misplaced, copied or counterfeited and being misused. Conversely, studies have shown that biometrics authentication systems particularly Iris Recognition Technology (IRT) and Fingerprint Recognition Technology (FRT) have the most reliable mechanisms to date providing tremendous accuracy and speed. As the technology becomes less expensive, application of IRT& FRT in smart-homes becomes more reliable and appropriate solution for security challenges. In this paper, we present our approach to design an authentication system for smart homes based on IRT, FRT and ARM7TDMI.The system employs two biometrics mechanisms for high reliability whereby initially, system users must enroll their fingerprints and eyes into the camera. Iris and fingerprint biometrics are scanned and the images are stored in the database. In the stage of authentication, FRT and IRT fingerprint scan and analyze points of the user's current input iris and fingerprint and match with the database contents. If one or more captured images do not match with the one in the database, then the system will not give authorization.

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Fredrick Romanus Ishengoma. 2014-10-02. Authentication System for Smart Homes Based on ARM7TDMI-S and IRIS-Fingerprint Recognition Technologies. https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.0534

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