Interacting social processes on interconnected networks

Abstract

We propose and study a model for the interplay between two different dynamical processes --one for opinion formation and the other for decision making-- on two interconnected networks $A$ and $B$. The opinion dynamics on network $A$ corresponds to that of the M-model, where the state of each agent can take one of four possible values ($S=-2,-1,1,2$), describing its level of agreement on a given issue. The likelihood to become an extremist ($S=\pm 2$) or a moderate ($S=\pm 1$) is controlled by a reinforcement parameter $r \ge 0$. The decision making dynamics on network $B$ is akin to that of the Abrams-Strogatz model, where agents can be either in favor ($S=+1$) or against ($S=-1$) the issue. The probability that an agent changes its state is proportional to the fraction of neighbors that hold the opposite state raised to a power $β$. Starting from a polarized case scenario in which all agents of network $A$ hold positive orientations while all agents of network $B$ have a negative orientation, we explore the conditions under which one of the dynamics prevails over the other, imposing its initial orientation. We find that, for a given value of $β$, the two-network system reaches a consensus in the positive state (initial state of network $A$) when the reinforcement overcomes a crossover value $r^*(β)$, while a negative consensus happens for $r β_c$. We develop an analytical mean-field approach that gives an insight into these regimes and shows that both dynamics are equivalent along the crossover line $(r^*,β^*)$.