arXiv · 1605.07544
Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games
Abstract
In games with continuous strategy spaces, if a rest point of the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable then the rest point must be finitely supported (van Veelen, M., Spreij, P., 2009. Evolution in games with a continuous action space. Econom. Theory 39 (3), 355-376). In this article, we address the converse question that is, we prove that a finitely supported population state is asymptotically stable with respect to the variational norm when it is strongly uninvadable.
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Dharini Hingu, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, A. J. Shaiju. 2016-05-24. Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07544
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