Flat ORAM: A Simplified Write-Only Oblivious RAM Construction for Secure Processors

Abstract

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive which obfuscates the access patterns to a storage thereby preventing privacy leakage. So far in the current literature, only `fully functional' ORAMs are widely studied which can protect, at a cost of considerable performance penalty, against the strong adversaries who can monitor all read and write operations. However, recent research has shown that information can still be leaked even if only the write access pattern (not reads) is visible to the adversary. For such weaker adversaries, a fully functional ORAM turns out to be an overkill causing unnecessary overheads. Instead, a simple `write-only' ORAM is sufficient, and, more interestingly, is preferred as it can offer far more performance and energy efficiency than a fully functional ORAM. In this work, we present Flat ORAM: an efficient write-only ORAM scheme which outperforms the closest existing write-only ORAM called HIVE. HIVE suffers from performance bottlenecks while managing the memory occupancy information vital for correctness of the protocol. Flat ORAM resolves these bottlenecks by introducing a simple idea of Occupancy Map (OccMap) which efficiently manages the memory occupancy information resulting in far better performance. Our simulation results show that, on average, Flat ORAM only incurs a moderate slowdown of $3\times$ over the insecure DRAM for memory intensive benchmarks among Splash2 and $1.6\times$ for SPEC06. Compared to HIVE, Flat ORAM offers $50\%$ performance gain on average and up to $80\%$ energy savings.