Composing Differential Privacy and Secure Computation: A case study on scaling private record linkage

Abstract

Private record linkage (PRL) is the problem of identifying pairs of records that are similar as per an input matching rule from databases held by two parties that do not trust one another. We identify three key desiderata that a PRL solution must ensure: 1) perfect precision and high recall of matching pairs, 2) a proof of end-to-end privacy, and 3) communication and computational costs that scale subquadratically in the number of input records. We show that all of the existing solutions for PRL - including secure 2-party computation (S2PC), and their variants that use non-private or differentially private (DP) blocking to ensure subquadratic cost - violate at least one of the three desiderata. In particular, S2PC techniques guarantee end-to-end privacy but have either low recall or quadratic cost. In contrast, no end-to-end privacy guarantee has been formalized for solutions that achieve subquadratic cost. This is true even for solutions that compose DP and S2PC: DP does not permit the release of any exact information about the databases, while S2PC algorithms for PRL allow the release of matching records. In light of this deficiency, we propose a novel privacy model, called output constrained differential privacy, that shares the strong privacy protection of DP, but allows for the truthful release of the output of a certain function applied to the data. We apply this to PRL, and show that protocols satisfying this privacy model permit the disclosure of the true matching records, but their execution is insensitive to the presence or absence of a single non-matching record. We find that prior work that combine DP and S2PC techniques even fail to satisfy this end-to-end privacy model. Hence, we develop novel protocols that provably achieve this end-to-end privacy guarantee, together with the other two desiderata of PRL.