Information vs. Uncertainty as the Foundation for a Science of Environmental Modeling

Abstract

Information accounting provides a better foundation for hypothesis testing than does uncertainty quantification. A quantitative account of science is derived under this perspective that alleviates the need for epistemic bridge principles, solves the problem of ad hoc falsification criteria, and deals with verisimilitude by facilitating a general approach to process-level diagnostics. Our argument is that the well-known inconsistencies of both Bayesian and classical statistical hypothesis tests are due to the fact that probability theory is an insufficient logic of science. Information theory, as an extension of probability theory, is required to provide a complete logic on which to base quantitative theories of empirical learning. The organizing question in this case becomes not whether our theories or models are more or less true, or about how much uncertainty is associated with a particular model, but instead whether there is any information available from experimental data that might allow us to improve the model. This becomes a formal hypothesis test, provides a theory of model diagnostics, and suggests a new approach to building dynamical systems models.