Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 1711.05189

CryptoDL: Deep Neural Networks over Encrypted Data

Abstract

Machine learning algorithms based on deep neural networks have achieved remarkable results and are being extensively used in different domains. However, the machine learning algorithms requires access to raw data which is often privacy sensitive. To address this issue, we develop new techniques to provide solutions for running deep neural networks over encrypted data. In this paper, we develop new techniques to adopt deep neural networks within the practical limitation of current homomorphic encryption schemes. More specifically, we focus on classification of the well-known convolutional neural networks (CNN). First, we design methods for approximation of the activation functions commonly used in CNNs (i.e. ReLU, Sigmoid, and Tanh) with low degree polynomials which is essential for efficient homomorphic encryption schemes. Then, we train convolutional neural networks with the approximation polynomials instead of original activation functions and analyze the performance of the models. Finally, we implement convolutional neural networks over encrypted data and measure performance of the models. Our experimental results validate the soundness of our approach with several convolutional neural networks with varying number of layers and structures. When applied to the MNIST optical character recognition tasks, our approach achieves 99.52\% accuracy which significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions and is very close to the accuracy of the best non-private version, 99.77\%. Also, it can make close to 164000 predictions per hour. We also applied our approach to CIFAR-10, which is much more complex compared to MNIST, and were able to achieve 91.5\% accuracy with approximation polynomials used as activation functions. These results show that CryptoDL provides efficient, accurate and scalable privacy-preserving predictions.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Ehsan Hesamifard, Hassan Takabi, Mehdi Ghasemi. 2017-11-14. CryptoDL: Deep Neural Networks over Encrypted Data. https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.05189

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MIRANDA: short signatures from a leakage-free full-domain-hash scheme

We present $\mathsf{Miranda}$, the first family of full-domain-hash signatures based on matrix codes. This signature scheme fulfils the paradigm of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan ($\mathsf{GPV}$), which gives strong security guarantees. Our trapdoor is very simple and generic: if we propose it with matrix codes, it can actually be instantiated in many other ways since it only involves a subcode of a decodable code (or lattice) in a unique decoding regime of parameters. Though $\mathsf{Miranda}$ signing algorithm relies on a decoding task where there is exactly one solution, there are many possible signatures given a message to sign and we ensure that signatures are not leaking information on their underlying trapdoor by means of a very simple procedure involving the drawing of a small number of uniform bits. In particular $\mathsf{Miranda}$ does not use a rejection sampling procedure which makes its implementation a very simple task contrary to other $\mathsf{GPV}$-like signatures schemes such as $\mathsf{Falcon}$ or even $\mathsf{Wave}$. We instantiate $\mathsf{Miranda}$ with the famous family of Gabidulin codes represented as spaces of matrices and we study thoroughly its security (in the EUF-CMA security model). For~$128$ bits of classical security, the signature sizes are as low as~$90$ bytes and the public key sizes are in the order of~$2.6$ megabytes.

cs.CR

SteganoBackdoor: Evading Data-Poisoning Defenses via Steganographic Backdoors

Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning defenses, prior work has increasingly focused on stylized triggers, synthetic artifacts, and token-level perturbations designed to evade detection. However, this trend has shifted threat models away from naturally occurring semantic triggers and realistic low-budget poisoning settings. Addressing this gap, we introduce SteganoBackdoor, an optimization-based framework that transforms semantic-trigger seeds through autoregressive token replacement, sequentially minimizing embedding overlap with the inference-time trigger while preserving a strong per-sample training-time payload. The resulting SteganoPoisons maintain linguistic fluency and encode the payload across ordinary tokens, such that no individual token carries a concentrated signal and the full payload instead emerges from their exact combination and ordering. Across 18 encoder-based and decoder-only models spanning 120M to 14B parameters, SteganoBackdoor achieves high attack success under sub-percent poisoning budgets and exposes limitations in existing data-poisoning defenses.

cs.CR

Foundations and Design Principles of Lightweight Cryptography for IoT Systems

The successful deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications relies heavily on their robust security, and lightweight cryptography is considered an emerging solution in this context. While existing surveys have been examining lightweight cryptographic techniques from the perspective of hardware and software implementations or performance evaluation, there is a significant gap in addressing different security aspects, such as design principles, specific to the IoT environment. This study aims to bridge this gap. This research presents an examination with focusing on the security evaluation of symmetric lightweight ciphers commonly used in IoT systems. The objective of this study is to provide a concise overview of lightweight ciphers with emphasizing on their security challenges which is an essential consideration for real-time and resource-constrained applications.

cs.CR