arXiv · 1801.07140
Courtesy as a Means to Coordinate
Abstract
We investigate the problem of multi-agent coordination under rationality constraints. Specifically, role allocation, task assignment, resource allocation, etc. Inspired by human behavior, we propose a framework (CA^3NONY) that enables fast convergence to efficient and fair allocations based on a simple convention of courtesy. We prove that following such convention induces a strategy which constitutes an $ε$-subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated allocation game with discounting. Simulation results highlight the effectiveness of CA^3NONY as compared to state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, since it achieves more than two orders of magnitude faster convergence, higher efficiency, fairness, and average payoff.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Panayiotis Danassis, Boi Faltings. 2019-05-08. Courtesy as a Means to Coordinate. https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.07140
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.