Bribery Games on Interdependent Complex Networks

Abstract

Bribe demands present a social conflict scenario where decisions have wide-ranging economic and ethical consequences. Nevertheless, such incidents occur daily in many countries across the globe. Harassment bribery constitute a significant sub-set of such bribery incidents where a government official demands a bribe for providing a service to a citizen legally entitled to it. We employ an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to analyse the evolution of corrupt and honest strategies in structured populations characterized by an interdependent complex network. The effects of changing network topology, average number of links and asymmetry in size of the citizen and officer population on the proliferation of incidents of bribery are explored. A complex network topology is found to be beneficial for the dominance of corrupt strategies over a larger region of phase space when compared with the outcome for a regular network, for equal citizen and officer population sizes. However, the extent of the advantage depends critically on the network degree and topology. A different trend is observed when there is a difference between the citizen and officer population sizes. Under those circumstances, increasing randomness of the underlying citizen network can be beneficial to the fixation of honest officers up to a certain value of the network degree. Our analysis reveals how the interplay between network topology, connectivity and strategy update rules can affect population level outcomes in such asymmetric games.