arXiv · 1808.02252
Efficient and DoS-resistant Consensus for Permissioned Blockchains
Abstract
Existing permissioned blockchain systems designate a fixed and explicit group of committee nodes to run a consensus protocol that confirms the same sequence of blocks among all nodes. Unfortunately, when such a permissioned blockchain runs in a large scale on the Internet, these explicit committee nodes can be easily turned down by denial-of-service (DoS) or network partition attacks. Although work proposes scalable BFT protocols that run on a larger number of committee nodes, their efficiency drops dramatically when only a small number of nodes are attacked. In this paper, our EGES protocol leverages Intel SGX to develop a new abstraction called "stealth committee", which effectively hides the committee nodes into a large pool of fake committee nodes. EGES selects a distinct group of stealth committee for each block and confirms the same sequence of blocks among all nodes with overwhelming probability. Evaluation on typical geo-distributed settings shows that: (1)EGES is the first permissioned blockchain's consensus protocol that can tolerate tough DoS and network partition attacks; and (2) EGES achieves comparable throughput and latency as existing permissioned blockchains' protocols
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Xusheng Chen, Shixiong Zhao, Ji Qi, Jianyu Jiang, Haoze Song, Cheng Wang, Tsz On Li, T. -H. Hubert Chan, Fengwei Zhang, Xiapu Luo, Sen Wang, Gong Zhang, Heming Cui. 2018-08-07. Efficient and DoS-resistant Consensus for Permissioned Blockchains. https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02252
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