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arXiv · 1902.00385

On Steering Swarms

Abstract

The main contribution of this paper is a novel method allowing an external observer/controller to steer and guide swarms of identical and indistinguishable agents, in spite of the agents' lack of information on absolute location and orientation. Importantly, this is done via simple global broadcast signals, based on the observed average swarm location, with no need to send control signals to any specific agent in the swarm.

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BibTeXRIS

Ariel Barel, Rotem Manor, Alfred M. Bruckstein. 2019-02-01. On Steering Swarms. https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.00385

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