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arXiv · 1907.07343

Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to the Stochastic Bellman Equation with Unbounded Shock

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
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Abstract

In this paper we develop a general framework to analyze stochastic dynamic problems with unbounded utility functions and correlated and unbounded shocks. We obtain new results of the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation through a general fixed point theorem that generalizes known results for Banach contractions and local contractions. We study an endogenous growth model as well as the Lucas asset pricing model in an exchange economy, significantly expanding their range of applicability.

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Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero. 2019-07-17. Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to the Stochastic Bellman Equation with Unbounded Shock. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07343

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