Different Types of Voice User Interface Failures May Cause Different Degrees of Frustration

Shiyoh Goetsu; Tetsuya Sakai

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arXiv · 2002.03582

Different Types of Voice User Interface Failures May Cause Different Degrees of Frustration

Shiyoh Goetsu·Tetsuya Sakai

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Abstract

We report on an investigation into how different types of failures in a voice user interface (VUI) affects user frustration. To this end, we conducted a pilot user study ($n=10$) and a main user study ($n=30$), both with a simple voice-operated calendar application that we built using the Alexa Skills Kit. In our pilot study, we identified three major failure types as perceived by the users, namely, Reason Unknown, Speech Misrecognition, and Utterance Pattern Match Failure, along with more fine-grained failure types from the developer's viewpoint such as Intent Pattern Match Failure and Intent Misclassification. Then, in our main study, we set up three user tasks that were designed to each induce a specific failure type, and collected user frustration ratings for each task. Our main findings are: (a)Users may be relatively tolerant to user-perceived Speech Misrecognition, and not so to user-perceived Reason Unknown and Utterance Mattern Match Failures; (b)Regarding the relationship between developer-perceived and user-perceived failure types, 68.8\% of developer-perceived Intent Misclassification instances caused user-perceived Reason Unkown failures. From (a) and (b), a practical design implication would be to try to prevent Intent Misclassification from happening by carefully crafting the utterance patterns for each intent.

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Shiyoh Goetsu, Tetsuya Sakai. 2020-02-10. Different Types of Voice User Interface Failures May Cause Different Degrees of Frustration. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03582

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