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arXiv · 2003.03119

Double-Layer Game Based Wireless Charging Scheduling for Electric Vehicles

Tian Wang·Bo Yang·Cailian Chen
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Abstract

Wireless charging technology provides a solution to the insufficient battery life of electric vehicles (EVs). However, the conflict of interests between wireless charging lanes (WCLs) and EVs is difficult to resolve. In the day-ahead electricity market, considering the revenue of WCLs caused by the deviation between actual electricity sales and pre-purchased electricity, as well as endurance and traveling experience of EVs, this paper proposes a charging scheduling algorithm based on a double-layer game model. In lower layer, the potential game is used to model the multi-vehicle game of vehicle charging planning. A shortest path algorithm based on the three-way greedy strategy is designed to solve in dynamic charging sequence problem, and the improved particle swarm optimization algorithm are used to solve the variable ordered potential game. In the upper layer, the reverse Stackelberg game is adopted to harmonize the cost of wireless charging lanes and electric vehicles. As the leader, WCLs stimulate EVs to carry out reasonable charing action by electricity price regulation. As the follower, EVs make the best charging decisions for a given electricity price. An iteration algorithm is designed to ensure the Nash equilibrium convergence of this game. The simulation results show that the double-layer game model proposed in this paper can effectively suppress the deviation between the actual electricity sales and the pre-sale of the charging lane caused by the disorderly charging behavior of the vehicle, and ensure the high endurance and traveling experience of EVs.

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Tian Wang, Bo Yang, Cailian Chen. 2020-03-06. Double-Layer Game Based Wireless Charging Scheduling for Electric Vehicles. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.03119

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