Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2003.03727

Min-Max Q-Learning for Multi-Player Pursuit-Evasion Games

Abstract

In this paper, we address a pursuit-evasion game involving multiple players by utilizing tools and techniques from reinforcement learning and matrix game theory. In particular, we consider the problem of steering an evader to a goal destination while avoiding capture by multiple pursuers, which is a high-dimensional and computationally intractable problem in general. In our proposed approach, we first formulate the multi-agent pursuit-evasion game as a sequence of discrete matrix games. Next, in order to simplify the solution process, we transform the high-dimensional state space into a low-dimensional manifold and the continuous action space into a feature-based space, which is a discrete abstraction of the original space. Based on these transformed state and action spaces, we subsequently employ min-max Q-learning, to generate the entries of the payoff matrix of the game, and subsequently obtain the optimal action for the evader at each stage. Finally, we present extensive numerical simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed learning-based evading strategy in terms of the evader's ability to reach the desired target location without being captured, as well as computational efficiency.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Jhanani Selvakumar, Efstathios Bakolas. 2020-03-08. Min-Max Q-Learning for Multi-Player Pursuit-Evasion Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.03727

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Co-Investment with Payoff-Sharing Mechanism for Cooperative Decision-Making in Network Design Games

Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system. This paper explores cooperative mechanisms that can simultaneously benefit both operators and users. We address this challenge using a game-theoretical framework that integrates both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. In the non-cooperative stage, we propose a network design game in which subnetwork decision-makers strategically design local infrastructures. In the cooperative stage, co-investment with payoff-sharing mechanism is developed to enlarge collective benefits and fairly distribute them. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, we conduct case studies on the Sioux Falls network and real-world public transport networks in Zurich and Winterthur, Switzerland. Our evaluation considers impacts on environmental sustainability, social welfare, and economic efficiency. The proposed framework provides a foundation for improving interdependent networked systems by enabling strategic cooperation among self-interested operators.

eess.SY

Generalizable Optimal Control with Transformers: One Policy Across Diverse Systems

Classical optimal control designs a separate controller for each plant. Even for the Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR), every new model must be identified and its Riccati equation re-solved. We ask whether a single learned policy can instead serve an entire family of systems, and we show that one transformer can. We train the policy to imitate optimal LQR state feedback across a collection of heterogeneous Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) systems that differ in their state and input dimensions and in their cost objectives. A shared representation lets the same parameters control every member of the family. It combines system-wise standardization, zero-padding and masking across dimensions, and an explicit encoding of the cost matrices. At run time, the policy maps a short window of recent states and the specified cost to a control action. It uses no plant matrices and identifies the dynamics implicitly from the state history. We evaluate on $28$ simulated systems over $9{,}675$ closed-loop rollouts, and no unstable rollout was observed in any of them. On the systems seen during training, it attains a median relative sub-optimality of $0.022\%$, even under parameter perturbations of up to $\pm10\%$. It transfers to unseen systems with lightweight fine-tuning, reaching a median sub-optimality of $0.19\%$. These results support transformers as generalizable near-optimal controllers for structured families of linear systems.

eess.SY

Two-Timescale Asymptotic Simulations of Hybrid Inclusions with Applications to Stochastic Hybrid Optimization

Convergence properties of model-free two-timescale asymptotic simulations of singularly perturbed hybrid inclusions are developed. A hybrid inclusion combines constrained differential and difference inclusions to capture continuous (flow) and discrete (jump) dynamics, respectively. Sufficient conditions are established under which sequences of iterates and step sizes constitute a two-timescale asymptotic simulation of such a system, with limiting behavior characterized via weakly invariant and internally chain-transitive sets of an associated boundary layer and reduced system. To illustrate the applicability of these results, conditions are given under which a two-timescale stochastic approximation of a hybrid optimization algorithm asymptotically recovers the behavior of its deterministic counterpart.

eess.SY