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arXiv · 2005.04037

Multi-Winner Election Control via Social Influence

Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi·Gianlorenzo D'Angelo
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Abstract

In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of the messages received by their neighbors in a social network. Specifically, we consider a political campaign that spreads messages in a social network in support or against a given candidate and the spreading follows a dynamic model for information diffusion. When a message reaches a voter, this latter changes its preference list according to an update rule. The election control problem asks to find a bounded set of nodes to be the starter of a political campaign in support (constructive problem) or against (destructive problem) a given target candidate $c$, in such a way that the margin of victory of $c$ w.r.t. its most voted opponents is maximized. It has been shown that several variants of the problem can be solved within a constant factor approximation of the optimum, which shows that controlling elections by means of social networks is doable and constitutes a real problem for modern democracies. Most of the literature, however, focuses on the case of single-winner elections. In this paper, we define the election control problem in social networks for "multi-winner elections" with the aim of modeling parliamentarian elections. Differently from the single-winner case, we show that the multi-winner election control problem is NP-hard to approximate within any factor in both constructive and destructive cases. We then study a relaxation of the problem where votes are aggregated on the basis of parties (instead of single candidates), which is a variation of the so-called "straight-party voting" used in some real parliamentarian elections. We show that the latter problem remains NP-hard but can be approximated within a constant factor.

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Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo. 2020-05-28. Multi-Winner Election Control via Social Influence. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.04037

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