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arXiv · 2007.14841

Who Manipulates Data During Pandemics? Evidence from Newcomb-Benford Law

Vadim S. Balashov·Yuxing Yan·Xiaodi Zhu
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Abstract

We use the Newcomb-Benford law to test if countries have manipulated reported data during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that democratic countries, countries with the higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, higher healthcare expenditures, and better universal healthcare coverage are less likely to deviate from the Newcomb-Benford law. The relationship holds for the cumulative number of reported deaths and total cases but is more pronounced for the death toll. The findings are robust for second-digit tests, for a sub-sample of countries with regional data, and in relation to the previous swine flu (H1N1) 2009-2010 pandemic. The paper further highlights the importance of independent surveillance data verification projects.

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Vadim S. Balashov, Yuxing Yan, Xiaodi Zhu. 2021-01-13. Who Manipulates Data During Pandemics? Evidence from Newcomb-Benford Law. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14841

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