Mythical Thought in Bohr's Anti-Realist Realism (Or: Lessons on How to Capture and Defeat Smoky Dragons)

Christian de Ronde

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arXiv · 2101.00255

Mythical Thought in Bohr's Anti-Realist Realism (Or: Lessons on How to Capture and Defeat Smoky Dragons)

Christian de Ronde

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Abstract

In this work we argue that the power and effectiveness of the Bohrian approach to quantum mechanics is essentially grounded on an inconsistent form of anti-realist realism which supports not only the uncritical tolerance -- in physics -- towards the "standard" account of the theory of quanta but also -- in philosophy -- to the mad reproduction of mythical (inconsistent and vague) narratives -- known as "interpretations". We will discuss the existence of -- what John Archibald Wheeler named -- "smoky dragons" not only within the standard formulation of the theory but also within the many interpretations that have been -- later on -- introduced by philosophers and philosophically inclined physicists. After analyzing the role of smoky dragons within both contemporary physics and philosophy of physics we will propose a general procedure grounded on a series of necessary theoretical conditions for producing meaningful physical concepts that -- hopefully -- could be used as tools and weapons to capture and defeat these beautiful and powerful mythical creatures.

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Christian de Ronde. 2022-08-22. Mythical Thought in Bohr's Anti-Realist Realism (Or: Lessons on How to Capture and Defeat Smoky Dragons). https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.00255

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