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arXiv · 2107.10133

HUAP: Practical Attribute-based Access Control Supporting Hidden Updatable Access Policies for Resource-Constrained Devices

Abstract

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising cryptographic mechanism for providing confidentiality and fine-grained access control in the cloud-based area. However, due to high computational overhead, common ABE schemes are not suitable for resource-constrained devices. Moreover, data owners should be able to update their defined access policies efficiently, and in some cases, applying hidden access policies is required to preserve the privacy of clients and data. In this paper, we propose a ciphertext-policy attribute-based access control scheme which for the first time provides online/offline encryption, hidden access policy, and access policy update simultaneously. In our scheme, resource-constrained devices are equipped with online/offline encryption reducing the encryption overhead significantly. Furthermore, attributes of access policies are hidden such that the attribute sets satisfying an access policy cannot be guessed by other parties. Moreover, data owners can update their defined access policies while outsourcing a major part of the updating process to the cloud service provider. In particular, we introduce blind access policies that enable the cloud service provider to update the data owners' access policies without receiving a new re-encryption key. Besides, our scheme supports fast decryption such that the decryption algorithm consists of a constant number of bilinear pairing operations. The proposed scheme is proven to be secure in the random oracle model and under the hardness of Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) and Decision Linear (D-Linear) assumptions. Also, performance analysis results demonstrate that the proposed scheme is efficient and practical.

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BibTeXRIS

Mostafa Chegenizadeh, Mohammad Ali, Javad Mohajeri, Mohammad Reza Aref. 2021-07-21. HUAP: Practical Attribute-based Access Control Supporting Hidden Updatable Access Policies for Resource-Constrained Devices. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.10133

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