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arXiv · 2201.01299

Von Neumann's book, the Compton-Simon experiment and the collapse hypothesis

Abstract

Few things in physics have caused so much hand-wringing as von Neumann's collapse hypothesis. Unable to derive it mathematically, von Neumann attributed it to interaction with the observer's brain! Few physicists agreed, but tweaks of von Neumann's measurement theory did not lead to collapse, and Shimony and Brown proved theorems establishing `the insolubility of the quantum measurement problem'. Many different `interpretations' of quantum mechanics were put forward, none gained a consensus, and some scholars suggested that the foundations of quantum mechanics were flawed to begin with. Yet, in the last ninety years, no-one looked into now von Neumann had arrived at his collapse hypothesis! Von Neumann based his argument on the experiment of Compton and Simon. But, by comparing readings from von Neumann's book and the Compton-Simon paper, we find that the experiment provides no evidence for the collapse hypothesis; von Neumann had misread it completely! We suggest that von Neumann had relied on his phenomenal memory rather than the printed Compton-Simon paper, and his memory had failed him for once. Our finding has considerable implications for physics, which -- briefly sketched here -- will be discussed elsewhere in detail. An Appendix raises some questions for historians of physics.

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R. N. Sen. 2022-01-04. Von Neumann's book, the Compton-Simon experiment and the collapse hypothesis. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.01299

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