Review of Peer-to-Peer Botnets and Detection Mechanisms

Khoh Choon Hwa; Selvakumar Manickam; Mahmood A. Al-Shareeda

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arXiv · 2207.12937

Review of Peer-to-Peer Botnets and Detection Mechanisms

Khoh Choon Hwa·Selvakumar Manickam·Mahmood A. Al-Shareeda

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Abstract

Cybercrimes are becoming a bigger menace to both people and corporations. It poses a serious challenge to the modern digital world. According to a press release from 2019 Cisco and Cybersecurity Ventures, Cisco stopped seven trillion threats in 2018, or 20 billion threats every day, on behalf of its clients. According to Cybersecurity Ventures, the global cost of cybercrime will reach \$6 trillion annually by 2021, which is significantly more than the annual damage caused by all natural disasters and more profitable than the global trade in all major illegal narcotics put together. Malware software, including viruses, worms, spyware, keyloggers, Trojan horses, and botnets, is therefore frequently used in cybercrime. The most common malware employed by attackers to carry out cybercrimes is the botnet, which is available in a variety of forms and for a variety of purposes when attacking computer assets. However, the issue continues to exist and worsen, seriously harming both enterprises and people who conduct their business online. The detection of P2P (Peer to Peer) botnet, which has emerged as one of the primary hazards in network cyberspace for acting as the infrastructure for several cyber-crimes, has proven more difficult than regular botnets using a few existing approaches. As a result, this study will explore various P2P botnet detection algorithms by outlining their essential characteristics, advantages and disadvantages, obstacles, and future research.

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BibTeX RIS

Khoh Choon Hwa, Selvakumar Manickam, Mahmood A. Al-Shareeda. 2022-07-17. Review of Peer-to-Peer Botnets and Detection Mechanisms. https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.12937

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