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arXiv · 2209.15103

Data Querying with Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption

Maryam Almarwani·Boris Konev·Alexei Lisitsa
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Abstract

Data encryption limits the power and efficiency of queries. Direct processing of encrypted data should ideally be possible to avoid the need for data decryption, processing, and re-encryption. It is vital to keep the data searchable and sortable. That is, some information is intentionally leaked. This intentional leakage technology is known as "querying over encrypted data schemes", which offer confidentiality as well as querying over encrypted data, but it is not meant to provide flexible access control. This paper suggests the use of Ciphertext Policy Attributes Based Encryption (CP-ABE) to address three security requirements, namely: confidentiality, queries over encrypted data, and flexible access control. By combining flexible access control and data confidentiality, CP-ABE can authenticate who can access data and possess the secret key. Thus, this paper identifies how much data leakage there is in order to figure out what kinds of operations are allowed when data is encrypted by CP-ABE.

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Maryam Almarwani, Boris Konev, Alexei Lisitsa. 2022-09-29. Data Querying with Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption. https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.15103

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