An improved decomposition-based heuristic for truck platooning

Boshuai Zhao; Roel Leus

Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2210.05562

An improved decomposition-based heuristic for truck platooning

Boshuai Zhao·Roel Leus

View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

Truck platooning is a promising transportation mode in which several trucks drive together and thus save fuel consumption by suffering less air resistance. In this paper, we consider a truck platooning system for which we jointly optimize the truck routes and schedules from the perspective of a central platform. We improve an existing decomposition-based heuristic by Luo and Larson (2022), which iteratively solves a routing and scheduling problem, with a cost modification step after each scheduling run. We propose different formulations for the routing and the scheduling problem and embed these into Luo and Larson's framework, and we examine ways to improve their iterative process. In addition, we propose another scheduling heuristic to deal with large instances. The computational results show that our procedure achieves better performance than the existing one under certain realistic settings.

Explore related subjects

econ.TH

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeX RIS

Boshuai Zhao, Roel Leus. 2023-02-19. An improved decomposition-based heuristic for truck platooning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.05562

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

Log-concave functions and transformations thereof

I summarize Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)'s review on log-concave functions, make several corrections, and augment the discussion with further results that can be useful in establishing monotone hazard rates. I also provide an application to monopoly pricing, where log-concavity of the demand curve implies strict concavity of the revenue function in quantity.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Audit the Auditors: Commitment versus Professional Judgment

This paper provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the trade-off between the self-regulated peer review system and independent government inspection (PCAOB) in the auditing profession. We model the peer review system as a Judgment Regime, where a stakeholder utilizes professional expertise, captured as a private signal, to make ex-post decisions on verifying audit failures. In contrast, PCAOB inspection is modeled as a Commitment Regime, where the stakeholder lacks private information but can commit ex-ante to a predetermined level of verification. We find that the Judgment Regime benefits from a resource-allocation effect and a deterrence effect driven by informed verification, whereas the Commitment Regime deters audit failures through the first-mover advantage of ex-ante commitment. Our analysis demonstrates that the stakeholder prefers the peer review system if and only if the private signal is sufficiently informative. Furthermore, comparative statics reveal that higher verification costs or stronger audit incentives shift the stakeholder's preference toward PCAOB inspection.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Reputation, Disclosure, and the Scope of Entry

This paper studies how learning about an incumbent affects the scope of entry when competitive responses use resources shared across markets. An entrant chooses whether to launch in neither, one, or both of two markets. Entry into the second market reduces the incumbent's cost-reducing response in the first and can make one-market entry unattractive. The entrant learns about the incumbent's capability from a record of its response to an earlier rival. More frequent publication encourages a less capable incumbent to imitate a more capable one. An observed response then becomes less informative, and entry after that record expands. We compare publication of conduct with a public audit of capability. For an open set of parameters with uniform setup costs, full publication maximizes total surplus within the specified policy class when publication costs are low. Removing the interaction between response costs across markets reverses this choice, while preserving all early and singleton-market payoffs. A capability audit is dominated in both economies. Expected entry scope is constant across the considered policies within each technology, although productive investment and the allocation of entry change.

econ.TH↗