Blockchain Technology to Secure Bluetooth

Athanasios Kalogiratos; Ioanna Kantzavelou

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arXiv · 2211.06451

Blockchain Technology to Secure Bluetooth

Athanasios Kalogiratos·Ioanna Kantzavelou

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Abstract

Bluetooth is a communication technology used to wirelessly exchange data between devices. In the last few years there have been found a great number of security vulnerabilities, and adversaries are taking advantage of them causing harm and significant loss. Numerous system security updates have been approved and installed in order to sort out security holes and bugs, and prevent attacks that could expose personal or other valuable information. But those updates are not sufficient and appropriate and new bugs keep showing up. In Bluetooth technology, pairing is identified as the step where most bugs are found and most attacks target this particular process part of Bluetooth. A new technology that has been proved bulletproof when it comes to security and the exchange of sensitive information is Blockchain. Blockchain technology is promising to be incorporated well in a network of smart devices, and secure an Internet of Things (IoT), where Bluetooth technology is being extensively used. This work presents a vulnerability discovered in Bluetooth pairing process, and proposes a Blockchain solution approach to secure pairing and mitigate this vulnerability. The paper first introduces the Bluetooth technology and delves into how Blockchain technology can be a solution to certain security problems. Then a solution approach shows how Blockchain can be integrated and implemented to ensure the required level of security. Certain attack incidents on Bluetooth vulnerable points are examined and discussion and conclusions give the extension of the security related problems.

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BibTeX RIS

Athanasios Kalogiratos, Ioanna Kantzavelou. 2022-11-11. Blockchain Technology to Secure Bluetooth. https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.06451

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