Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2212.05309

Soft detection physical layer insecurity

Abstract

We establish that during the execution of any Guessing Random Additive Noise Decoding (GRAND) algorithm, an interpretable, useful measure of decoding confidence can be evaluated. This measure takes the form of a log-likelihood ratio (LLR) of the hypotheses that, should a decoding be found by a given query, the decoding is correct versus its being incorrect. That LLR can be used as soft output for a range of applications and we demonstrate its utility by showing that it can be used to confidently discard likely erroneous decodings in favor of returning more readily managed erasures. We show that feature can be used to compromise the physical layer security of short length wiretap codes by accurately and confidently revealing a proportion of a communication when code-rate is far above the Shannon capacity of the associated hard detection channel.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Ken R. Duffy, Muriel Medard. 2023-04-12. Soft detection physical layer insecurity. https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05309

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Fundamental Scaling Laws of Covert Communication in the Presence of Block Fading

Covert communication is the undetected transmission of sensitive information over a communication channel. In wireless communication systems, channel impairments such as signal fading present challenges in the effective implementation and analysis of covert communication systems. This paper generalizes early work in the covert communication field by considering asymptotic results for the number of bits that can be covertly transmitted in $n$ channel uses on a block fading channel. Critical to the investigation is characterizing the performance of optimal detectors at the adversary. Matching achievable and converse results are presented.

cs.IT

Sequence Reconstruction over the Deletion Channel

In this paper, we consider the Levenshtein's sequence reconstruction problem in the case where the transmitted codeword is chosen from $\{0,1\}^n$ and the channel can delete up to $t$ symbols from the transmitted codeword. We determine the minimum number of channel outputs (assuming that they are distinct) required to reconstruct a list of size $\ell-1$ of candidate sequences, one of which corresponds to the original transmitted sequence. More specifically, we determine the maximum possible size of the intersection of $\ell \geq 3$ deletion balls of radius $t$ centered at $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{\ell}$, where $x_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ for all $i \in \{1,2,\dots,\ell\}$ and $x_i \neq x_j$ for $i \neq j$, with $ n \geq t+\ell-1$ and $t \geq 1$.

cs.IT

A generalization of the map $χ$

The mapping $ χ_n:\mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$ defined by $y=χ_n(x)$ with $y_i = x_i + x_{i+1}x_{i+2} + x_{i+2}$, where the indices are computed modulo $n$, has been widely studied for its application in lightweight cryptography. In this paper, we generalize this mapping and completely characterize all these shift-invariant permutations of the form $y_i=x_{i+u}+x_{i+v}(x_{i+w}+a_i)$, where $0\le u, v, w<n$ and $a_i\in \mathbb{F}_2$, $1\le i\le n$.

cs.IT