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arXiv · 2301.04266

Illegal Intelligent Reflecting Surface Based Active Channel Aging: When Jammer Can Attack Without Power and CSI

Huan Huang·Ying Zhang·Hongliang Zhang·Chongfu Zhang·Zhu Han
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Abstract

Illegal intelligent reflecting surfaces (I-IRSs), i.e., the illegal deployment and utilization of IRSs, impose serious harmful impacts on wireless networks. The existing I-IRS-based illegal jammer (IJ) requires channel state information (CSI) or extra power or both, and therefore, the I-IRS-based IJ seems to be difficult to implement in practical wireless networks. To raise concerns about significant potential threats posed by I-IRSs, we propose an alternative method to jam legitimate users (LUs) without relying on the CSI. By using an I-IRS to actively change wireless channels, the orthogonality of multi-user beamforming vectors and the co-user channels is destroyed, and significant inter-user interference is then caused, which is referred to as active channel aging. Such a fully-passive jammer (FPJ) can launch jamming attacks on multi-user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) systems via inter-user interference caused by active channel aging, where the IJ requires no additional transmit power and instantaneous CSI. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed FPJ scheme. Moreover, we also investigate how the transmit power and the number of quantization phase shift bits influence the jamming performance.

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Huan Huang, Ying Zhang, Hongliang Zhang, Chongfu Zhang, Zhu Han. 2023-01-11. Illegal Intelligent Reflecting Surface Based Active Channel Aging: When Jammer Can Attack Without Power and CSI. https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.04266

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