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arXiv · 2303.13204

A Privacy-Preserving Energy Theft Detection Model for Effective Demand-Response Management in Smart Grids

Abstract

The detection of energy thefts is vital for the safety of the whole smart grid system. However, the detection alone is not enough since energy thefts can crucially affect the electricity supply leading to some blackouts. Moreover, privacy is one of the major challenges that must be preserved when dealing with clients' energy data. This is often overlooked in energy theft detection research as most current detection techniques rely on raw, unencrypted data, which may potentially expose sensitive and personal data. To solve this issue, we present a privacy-preserving energy theft detection technique with effective demand management that employs two layers of privacy protection. We explore a split learning mechanism that trains a detection model in a decentralised fashion without the need to exchange raw data. We also employ a second layer of privacy by the use of a masking scheme to mask clients' outputs in order to prevent inference attacks. A privacy-enhanced version of this mechanism also employs an additional layer of privacy protection by training a randomisation layer at the end of the client-side model. This is done to make the output as random as possible without compromising the detection performance. For the energy theft detection part, we design a multi-output machine learning model to identify energy thefts, estimate their volume, and effectively predict future demand. Finally, we use a comprehensive set of experiments to test our proposed scheme. The experimental results show that our scheme achieves high detection accuracy and greatly improves the privacy preservation degree.

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BibTeXRIS

Arwa Alromih, John A. Clark, Prosanta Gope. 2023-03-23. A Privacy-Preserving Energy Theft Detection Model for Effective Demand-Response Management in Smart Grids. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13204

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