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arXiv · 2305.19719

Low-Complexity Dynamic Directional Modulation: Vulnerability and Information Leakage

Abstract

In this paper, the privacy of wireless transmissions is improved through the use of an efficient technique termed dynamic directional modulation (DDM), and is subsequently assessed in terms of the measure of information leakage. Recently, a variation of DDM termed low-power dynamic directional modulation (LPDDM) has attracted significant attention as a prominent secure transmission method due to its ability to further improve the privacy of wireless communications. Roughly speaking, this modulation operates by randomly selecting the transmitting antenna from an antenna array whose radiation pattern is well known. Thereafter, the modulator adjusts the constellation phase so as to ensure that only the legitimate receiver recovers the information. To begin with, we highlight some privacy boundaries inherent to the underlying system. In addition, we propose features that the antenna array must meet in order to increase the privacy of a wireless communication system. Last, we adopt a uniform circular monopole antenna array with equiprobable transmitting antennas in order to assess the impact of DDM on the information leakage. It is shown that the bit error rate, while being a useful metric in the evaluation of wireless communication systems, does not provide the full information about the vulnerability of the underlying system.

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BibTeXRIS

Pedro E. Gória Silva, Adam Narbudowicz, Nicola Marchetti, Pedro H. J. Nardelli, Rausley A. A. de Souza, Jules M. Moualeu. 2023-05-31. Low-Complexity Dynamic Directional Modulation: Vulnerability and Information Leakage. https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2023.3310587

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