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arXiv · 2306.01989

Optimized Vectorization Implementation of CRYSTALS-Dilithium

Abstract

CRYSTALS-Dilithium is a lattice-based signature scheme to be standardized by NIST as the primary post-quantum signature algorithm. In this work, we make a thorough study of optimizing the implementations of Dilithium by utilizing the Advanced Vector Extension (AVX) instructions, specifically AVX2 and the latest AVX-512. We first present an improved parallel small polynomial multiplication with tailored early evaluation (PSPM-TEE) to further speed up the signing procedure. Our PSPM algorithm outperform the NTT by 47%-66% in AVX2 and AVX-512 implementation. We then present a tailored reduction method that is simpler and faster than Montgomery reduction. We minimize the CPU cycles of tailored reduction AVX-512 implementation by using AVX-512IFMA. Finally, we propose a fully and highly vectorized implementation of Dilithium using AVX-512. This is achieved by carefully vectorizing most of Dilithium functions with the AVX-512 instructions in order to improve efficiency both for time and for space simultaneously. With all the optimization efforts, our AVX-512 implementation improves the performance by 43.2%/39.3%/45.6% in key generation, 36.6%/41.6%/43.7% in signing, and 45.3%/46.5%/47.4% in verification for the parameter sets of Dilithium2/3/5 respectively. To the best of our knowledge, our AVX-512 implementation has the best performance for Dilithium on the Intel x86-64 CPU platform to date.

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BibTeXRIS

Jieyu Zheng, Haoliang Zhu, Zhenyu Song, Zheng Wang, Yunlei Zhao. 2023-06-03. Optimized Vectorization Implementation of CRYSTALS-Dilithium. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.01989

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