Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2308.03952

Exploring Security Practices in Infrastructure as Code: An Empirical Study

Abstract

Cloud computing has become popular thanks to the widespread use of Infrastructure as Code (IaC) tools, allowing the community to conveniently manage and configure cloud infrastructure using scripts. However, the scripting process itself does not automatically prevent practitioners from introducing misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, or privacy risks. As a result, ensuring security relies on practitioners understanding and the adoption of explicit policies, guidelines, or best practices. In order to understand how practitioners deal with this problem, in this work, we perform an empirical study analyzing the adoption of IaC scripted security best practices. First, we select and categorize widely recognized Terraform security practices promulgated in the industry for popular cloud providers such as AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud. Next, we assess the adoption of these practices by each cloud provider, analyzing a sample of 812 open-source projects hosted on GitHub. For that, we scan each project configuration files, looking for policy implementation through static analysis (checkov). Additionally, we investigate GitHub measures that might be correlated with adopting these best practices. The category Access policy emerges as the most widely adopted in all providers, while Encryption in rest are the most neglected policies. Regarding GitHub measures correlated with best practice adoption, we observe a positive, strong correlation between a repository number of stars and adopting practices in its cloud infrastructure. Based on our findings, we provide guidelines for cloud practitioners to limit infrastructure vulnerability and discuss further aspects associated with policies that have yet to be extensively embraced within the industry.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Alexandre Verdet, Mohammad Hamdaqa, Leuson Da Silva, Foutse Khomh. 2023-08-07. Exploring Security Practices in Infrastructure as Code: An Empirical Study. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10664-024-10610-0

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MIRANDA: short signatures from a leakage-free full-domain-hash scheme

We present $\mathsf{Miranda}$, the first family of full-domain-hash signatures based on matrix codes. This signature scheme fulfils the paradigm of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan ($\mathsf{GPV}$), which gives strong security guarantees. Our trapdoor is very simple and generic: if we propose it with matrix codes, it can actually be instantiated in many other ways since it only involves a subcode of a decodable code (or lattice) in a unique decoding regime of parameters. Though $\mathsf{Miranda}$ signing algorithm relies on a decoding task where there is exactly one solution, there are many possible signatures given a message to sign and we ensure that signatures are not leaking information on their underlying trapdoor by means of a very simple procedure involving the drawing of a small number of uniform bits. In particular $\mathsf{Miranda}$ does not use a rejection sampling procedure which makes its implementation a very simple task contrary to other $\mathsf{GPV}$-like signatures schemes such as $\mathsf{Falcon}$ or even $\mathsf{Wave}$. We instantiate $\mathsf{Miranda}$ with the famous family of Gabidulin codes represented as spaces of matrices and we study thoroughly its security (in the EUF-CMA security model). For~$128$ bits of classical security, the signature sizes are as low as~$90$ bytes and the public key sizes are in the order of~$2.6$ megabytes.

cs.CR

SteganoBackdoor: Evading Data-Poisoning Defenses via Steganographic Backdoors

Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning defenses, prior work has increasingly focused on stylized triggers, synthetic artifacts, and token-level perturbations designed to evade detection. However, this trend has shifted threat models away from naturally occurring semantic triggers and realistic low-budget poisoning settings. Addressing this gap, we introduce SteganoBackdoor, an optimization-based framework that transforms semantic-trigger seeds through autoregressive token replacement, sequentially minimizing embedding overlap with the inference-time trigger while preserving a strong per-sample training-time payload. The resulting SteganoPoisons maintain linguistic fluency and encode the payload across ordinary tokens, such that no individual token carries a concentrated signal and the full payload instead emerges from their exact combination and ordering. Across 18 encoder-based and decoder-only models spanning 120M to 14B parameters, SteganoBackdoor achieves high attack success under sub-percent poisoning budgets and exposes limitations in existing data-poisoning defenses.

cs.CR

Foundations and Design Principles of Lightweight Cryptography for IoT Systems

The successful deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications relies heavily on their robust security, and lightweight cryptography is considered an emerging solution in this context. While existing surveys have been examining lightweight cryptographic techniques from the perspective of hardware and software implementations or performance evaluation, there is a significant gap in addressing different security aspects, such as design principles, specific to the IoT environment. This study aims to bridge this gap. This research presents an examination with focusing on the security evaluation of symmetric lightweight ciphers commonly used in IoT systems. The objective of this study is to provide a concise overview of lightweight ciphers with emphasizing on their security challenges which is an essential consideration for real-time and resource-constrained applications.

cs.CR