Rationality and connectivity in stochastic learning for networked coordination games

Abstract

Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the graph has bounded rationality, and uses a distributed stochastic learning algorithm to update its action choice conditioned on the actions currently played by its neighbors. After establishing that our framework leads to a potential game, we analyze the regime of bounded rationality, where the agents are allowed to make sub-optimal decisions with some probability. Our analysis shows that there is a relationship between the connectivity of the network, and the rationality of the agents. In particular, we show that in some scenarios, an agent can afford to be less rational and still converge to a near optimal collective strategy, provided that its connectivity degree increases. Such phenomenon is akin to the wisdom of crowds.