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arXiv · 2310.11983

A Consensus-Based Generalized Multi-Population Aggregative Game with Application to Charging Coordination of Electric Vehicles

Mahsa Ghavami·Babak Ghaffarzadeh Bakhshayesh·Mohammad Haeri·Giacomo Como·Hamed Kebriaei
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Abstract

This paper introduces a consensus-based generalized multi-population aggregative game coordination approach with application to electric vehicles charging under transmission line constraints. The algorithm enables agents to seek an equilibrium solution while considering the limited infrastructure capacities that impose coupling constraints among the users. The Nash-seeking algorithm consists of two interrelated iterations. In the upper layer, population coordinators collaborate for a distributed estimation of the coupling aggregate term in the agents' cost function and the associated Lagrange multiplier of the coupling constraint, transmitting the latest updated values to their population's agents. In the lower layer, each agent updates its best response based on the most recent information received and communicates it back to its population coordinator. For the case when the agents' best response mappings are non-expansive, we prove the algorithm's convergence to the generalized Nash equilibrium point of the game. Simulation results demonstrate the algorithm's effectiveness in achieving equilibrium in the presence of a coupling constraint.

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Mahsa Ghavami, Babak Ghaffarzadeh Bakhshayesh, Mohammad Haeri, Giacomo Como, Hamed Kebriaei. 2023-10-18. A Consensus-Based Generalized Multi-Population Aggregative Game with Application to Charging Coordination of Electric Vehicles. https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.11983

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