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arXiv · 2311.17930

Pragmatic Nonsense

Abstract

Inspired by the early Wittgenstein's concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we investigate two different types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is defined in accordance with Tarski's semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense is in turn formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. Pragmatic nonsense extends formal nonsense, the same way da Costa's pragmatic truth is an extension of Tarski's definition of truth. An expression is thus considered formally nonsensical in case the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) are not met; and an expression, or even a well-formed formula, is considered pragmatically nonsensical if either the formal or the pragmatic criteria of relevance (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any pragmatic truth-value (pragmatically true or pragmatically false) are not met. We also introduce the concept of strictly pragmatic truth, which excludes pragmatic nonsense and necessarily depends on certain criteria of relevance, unlike the original definition of pragmatic truth/quasi-truth.

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BibTeXRIS

Ricardo P. Cavassane, Itala M. L. D'Ottaviano, Felipe S. Abrahão. 2024-11-17. Pragmatic Nonsense. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.17930

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