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arXiv · 2312.06927

WE economy: Potential of mutual aid distribution based on moral responsibility and risk vulnerability

Abstract

Reducing wealth inequality and disparity is a global challenge. The economic system is mainly divided into (1) gift and reciprocity, (2) power and redistribution, (3) market exchange, and (4) mutual aid without reciprocal obligations. The current inequality stems from a capitalist economy consisting of (2) and (3). To sublimate (1), which is the human economy, to (4), the concept of a "mixbiotic society" has been proposed in the philosophical realm. This is a society in which free and diverse individuals, "I," mix with each other, recognize their respective "fundamental incapability" and sublimate them into "WE" solidarity. The economy in this society must have moral responsibility as a coadventurer and consideration for vulnerability to risk. Therefore, I focus on two factors of mind perception: moral responsibility and risk vulnerability, and propose a novel model of wealth distribution following an econophysical approach. Specifically, I developed a joint-venture model, a redistribution model in the joint-venture model, and a "WE economy" model. A simulation comparison of a combination of the joint ventures and redistribution with the WE economies reveals that WE economies are effective in reducing inequality and resilient in normalizing wealth distribution as advantages, and susceptible to free riders as disadvantages. However, this disadvantage can be compensated for by fostering consensus and fellowship, and by complementing it with joint ventures. This study essentially presents the effectiveness of moral responsibility, the complementarity between the WE economy and the joint economy, and the direction of the economy toward reducing inequality. Future challenges are to develop the WE economy model based on real economic analysis and psychology, as well as to promote WE economy fieldwork for worker coops and platform cooperatives to realize a desirable mixbiotic society.

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BibTeXRIS

Takeshi Kato. 2023-12-12. WE economy: Potential of mutual aid distribution based on moral responsibility and risk vulnerability. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0301928

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