Edge AI Empowered Physical Layer Security for 6G NTN: Potential Threats and Future Opportunities

Hong-fu Chou; Sourabh Solanki; Vu Nguyen Ha; Lin Chen; Sean Longyu Ma; Hayder Al-Hraishawi; Geoffrey Eappen; Symeon Chatzinotas

arXiv · 2401.01005

Edge AI Empowered Physical Layer Security for 6G NTN: Potential Threats and Future Opportunities

Hong-fu Chou·Sourabh Solanki·Vu Nguyen Ha·Lin Chen·Sean Longyu Ma·Hayder Al-Hraishawi·Geoffrey Eappen·Symeon Chatzinotas

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Abstract

Due to the enormous potential for economic profit offered by artificial intelligence (AI) servers, the field of cybersecurity has the potential to emerge as a prominent arena for competition among corporations and governments on a global scale. One of the prospective applications that stands to gain from the utilization of AI technology is the advancement in the field of cybersecurity. To this end, this paper provides an overview of the possible risks that the physical layer may encounter in the context of 6G Non-Terrestrial Networks (NTN). With the objective of showcasing the effectiveness of cutting-edge AI technologies in bolstering physical layer security, this study reviews the most foreseeable design strategies associated with the integration of edge AI in the realm of 6G NTN. The findings of this paper provide some insights and serve as a foundation for future investigations aimed at enhancing the physical layer security of edge servers/devices in the next generation of trustworthy 6G telecommunication networks.

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Hong-fu Chou, Sourabh Solanki, Vu Nguyen Ha, Lin Chen, Sean Longyu Ma, Hayder Al-Hraishawi, Geoffrey Eappen, Symeon Chatzinotas. 2024-11-14. Edge AI Empowered Physical Layer Security for 6G NTN: Potential Threats and Future Opportunities. https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01005

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