arXiv · 2401.09304
Measurement-induced asymmetry in bipartite networks
Abstract
We consider an interacting bipartite network through a Bayesian game-theoretic framework and demonstrate that weak measurements introduce an inherent asymmetry that is not present when using standard projective measurements. These asymmetries are revealed in the expected payoff for a Bayesian version of Prisoner's dilemma, demonstrating that certain advantages can be found for given subsystems depending on the measurements performed in the network. We demonstrate that this setup allows measurement-induced control for one of the respective parties.
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A. Lowe, E. Medina-Guerra. 2024-01-17. Measurement-induced asymmetry in bipartite networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.09304
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