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arXiv · 2404.10543

Characterizing Polkadot's Transactions Ecosystem: methodology, tools, and insights

Maurantonio Caprolu·Roberto Di Pietro·Flavio Lombardi·Elia Onofri
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Abstract

The growth potential of a crypto(currency) project can be measured by the use cases spurred by the underlying technology. However, these projects are usually distributed, with a weak feedback schemes. Hence, a metric that is widely used as a proxy for their healthiness is the number of transactions and related volumes. Nevertheless, such a metric can be subject to manipulation (the crypto market being an unregulated one magnifies such a risk). To address the cited gap we design a comprehensive methodology to process large cryptocurrency transaction graphs that, after clustering user addresses of interest, derives a compact representation of the network that highlights clusters interactions. To show the viability of our solution, we bring forward a use case centered on Polkadot, which has gained significant attention in the digital currency landscape due to its pioneering approach to interoperability and scalability. However, little is known about how many and to what extent its wide range of enabled use cases have been adopted by end-users so far. The answer to this type of question means mapping Polkadot (or any analyzed crypto project) on a palette that ranges from a thriving ecosystem to a speculative coin without compelling use cases. Our findings demonstrate that crypto exchanges exert considerable influence on the Polkadot network, owning nearly 40% of all addresses in the ledger and absorbing at least 80% of all transactions. In addition, the high volume of inter-exchange transactions (> 20%) underscores the strong interconnections among just a couple of prominent exchanges, prompting further investigations into the behavior of these actors to uncover potential unethical activities, such as wash trading. These results, while characterized by a high level of scalability and adaptability, are at the same time immune from the drawbacks of currently used metrics.

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Maurantonio Caprolu, Roberto Di Pietro, Flavio Lombardi, Elia Onofri. 2024-04-16. Characterizing Polkadot's Transactions Ecosystem: methodology, tools, and insights. https://doi.org/10.1109/dapps61106.2024.00016

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