Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2404.12675

ESPM-D: Efficient Sparse Polynomial Multiplication for Dilithium on ARM Cortex-M4 and Apple M2

Abstract

Dilithium is a lattice-based digital signature scheme standardized by the NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project. In this study, we focus on developing efficient sparse polynomial multiplication implementations of Dilithium for ARM Cortex-M4 and Apple M2, which are both based on the ARM architecture. The ARM Cortex-M4 is commonly utilized in resource-constrained devices such as sensors. Conversely, the Apple M2 is typically found on mobile devices, emphasizing high performance and versatility. Accordingly, our optimization strategies differ between ARM Cortex-M4 and Apple M2. We prioritize optimizing stack usage for the former while enhancing computational efficiency for the latter. Our optimized sparse polynomial multiplication achieves significant speedups of up to 30% on ARM Cortex-M4 and 55% on Apple M2 compared to the state-of-the-art Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) implementation. Additionally, we integrate the sparse polynomial multiplication with the infinity norm judgments in the Dilithium signing process, further enhancing signing efficiency. Our optimized implementation not only reduces stack usage by 10.8%, 1.2%, and 7.7% in the signing procedure of Dilithium2, Dilithium3, and Dilithium5, respectively, but also enhances signing performance by 0.4% to 0.8% compared to the state-of-the-art ARM Cortex-M4 implementation. Furthermore, we optimize polynomial sampling, rounding functions, and polynomial packing and unpacking using ARM Cortex-M4 DSP instructions, resulting in a 0.4%-3.2% improvement in key generation and verification procedures. On the MacBook Air 2022, our Dilithium implementation achieves 10% to 11% speedups in the signing procedure. To the best of our knowledge, our work sets new performance records for Dilithium on both ARM Cortex-M4 and Apple M2 platforms.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Jieyu Zheng, Hong Zhang, Le Tian, Zhuo Zhang, Hanyu Wei, Zhiwei Chu, Yafang Yang, Yunlei Zhao. 2024-04-19. ESPM-D: Efficient Sparse Polynomial Multiplication for Dilithium on ARM Cortex-M4 and Apple M2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.12675

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MIRANDA: short signatures from a leakage-free full-domain-hash scheme

We present $\mathsf{Miranda}$, the first family of full-domain-hash signatures based on matrix codes. This signature scheme fulfils the paradigm of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan ($\mathsf{GPV}$), which gives strong security guarantees. Our trapdoor is very simple and generic: if we propose it with matrix codes, it can actually be instantiated in many other ways since it only involves a subcode of a decodable code (or lattice) in a unique decoding regime of parameters. Though $\mathsf{Miranda}$ signing algorithm relies on a decoding task where there is exactly one solution, there are many possible signatures given a message to sign and we ensure that signatures are not leaking information on their underlying trapdoor by means of a very simple procedure involving the drawing of a small number of uniform bits. In particular $\mathsf{Miranda}$ does not use a rejection sampling procedure which makes its implementation a very simple task contrary to other $\mathsf{GPV}$-like signatures schemes such as $\mathsf{Falcon}$ or even $\mathsf{Wave}$. We instantiate $\mathsf{Miranda}$ with the famous family of Gabidulin codes represented as spaces of matrices and we study thoroughly its security (in the EUF-CMA security model). For~$128$ bits of classical security, the signature sizes are as low as~$90$ bytes and the public key sizes are in the order of~$2.6$ megabytes.

cs.CR

SteganoBackdoor: Evading Data-Poisoning Defenses via Steganographic Backdoors

Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning defenses, prior work has increasingly focused on stylized triggers, synthetic artifacts, and token-level perturbations designed to evade detection. However, this trend has shifted threat models away from naturally occurring semantic triggers and realistic low-budget poisoning settings. Addressing this gap, we introduce SteganoBackdoor, an optimization-based framework that transforms semantic-trigger seeds through autoregressive token replacement, sequentially minimizing embedding overlap with the inference-time trigger while preserving a strong per-sample training-time payload. The resulting SteganoPoisons maintain linguistic fluency and encode the payload across ordinary tokens, such that no individual token carries a concentrated signal and the full payload instead emerges from their exact combination and ordering. Across 18 encoder-based and decoder-only models spanning 120M to 14B parameters, SteganoBackdoor achieves high attack success under sub-percent poisoning budgets and exposes limitations in existing data-poisoning defenses.

cs.CR

Foundations and Design Principles of Lightweight Cryptography for IoT Systems

The successful deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications relies heavily on their robust security, and lightweight cryptography is considered an emerging solution in this context. While existing surveys have been examining lightweight cryptographic techniques from the perspective of hardware and software implementations or performance evaluation, there is a significant gap in addressing different security aspects, such as design principles, specific to the IoT environment. This study aims to bridge this gap. This research presents an examination with focusing on the security evaluation of symmetric lightweight ciphers commonly used in IoT systems. The objective of this study is to provide a concise overview of lightweight ciphers with emphasizing on their security challenges which is an essential consideration for real-time and resource-constrained applications.

cs.CR