A Taxation Perspective for Fair Re-ranking

Abstract

Fair re-ranking aims to redistribute ranking slots among items more equitably to ensure responsibility and ethics. The exploration of redistribution problems has a long history in economics, offering valuable insights for conceptualizing fair re-ranking as a taxation process. Such a formulation provides us with a fresh perspective to re-examine fair re-ranking and inspire the development of new methods. From a taxation perspective, we theoretically demonstrate that most previous fair re-ranking methods can be reformulated as an item-level tax policy. Ideally, a good tax policy should be effective and conveniently controllable to adjust ranking resources. However, both empirical and theoretical analyses indicate that the previous item-level tax policy cannot meet two ideal controllable requirements: (1) continuity, ensuring minor changes in tax rates result in small accuracy and fairness shifts; (2) controllability over accuracy loss, ensuring precise estimation of the accuracy loss under a specific tax rate. To overcome these challenges, we introduce a new fair re-ranking method named Tax-rank, which levies taxes based on the difference in utility between two items. Then, we efficiently optimize such an objective by utilizing the Sinkhorn algorithm in optimal transport. Upon a comprehensive analysis, Our model Tax-rank offers a superior tax policy for fair re-ranking, theoretically demonstrating both continuity and controllability over accuracy loss. Experimental results show that Tax-rank outperforms all state-of-the-art baselines in terms of effectiveness and efficiency on recommendation and advertising tasks.